Strong social capital is increasingly recognized as an organizational advantage. Better knowledge sharing and reduced transaction costs increase work efficiency. To mimic the formation of the associated communication network, we propose the Expert Game, where each individual must find a specific expert and receive her help. Participants act in an impersonal environment and under time constraints that provide short-term incentives for noncooperative behavior. Despite these constraints, we observe cooperation between individuals and the self-organization of a sustained trust network, which facilitates efficient communication channels with increased information flow. We build a behavioral model that explains the experimental dynamics. Analysis of the model reveals an exploitation protection mechanism and measurable social capital, which quantitatively describe the economic utility of trust.
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social capital | cooperation evolution | communication network | experimental economics | game theory I n the light of increasing specialization in modern organizations, experts involved in interdisciplinary tasks must communicate efficiently. Efficient communication is fostered by the formation of strong ties established, for example, through previously helpful behavior (1, 2) . Additional weak ties may be necessary for acquisition of crucial information (3) (4) (5) . Also, time constraints are characteristic of professional environments and force prioritization of actions (6, 7) . Individuals, therefore, face a dilemma: they can work toward accomplishing their own goals or establish and maintain social ties through helpful behavior. Both are necessary for long-term success.
Much work has gone into better understanding of cooperation between humans both experimentally (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) and by modeling (9, (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) . Iterated prisoner's dilemma experiments showed low levels of cooperation when individuals were arranged on static networks (13) . In dynamic networks, higher rates of cooperation were achieved (10, 11, 14) . In these experiments, participants had to make binary decisions: cooperate with all direct neighbors or do not cooperate.
Central to the formation of cooperation is the concept of trust. Although "trust" has proven difficult to define unambiguously, here we refer to trust as the expectation of future cooperation. Our definition is founded in classic work by Deutsch, who states that both the "notion of motivational relevance" and that of "predictability" are implicated in "trust" (24) . A trusted individual may be one from whom a certain reaction to a given request is expected. As Deutsch (24) and others (25, 26) state, trust further involves risk in the sense that, when trust fails to be fulfilled, the "trusting individual will suffer unpleasant consequences." Especially regarding virtual teams, which make use of electronic communication, trust has drawn substantial research interest (27) (28) (29) . Electronic communication often comes with less frequent face to face encounter. It was, therefore, called into question whether trust would even be possible in electronic contexts (29) .
Closely related to trust is the concept of "social capital." We here ascribe to the definition of social capital by Robison et al. (30) as the "potential benefit, advantage, or preferential treatment" that can be obtained from sympathy towards another person or group. Social capital, hence, captures the ability of social ties to help generate economic advantage. In distinction to other forms of capital (e.g., human or physical capital), social capital resides not within an individual but within the social ties between individuals.
Models of trust building and social capital based on electronic communication must account for the fact that choices are not as black or white in electronic messaging as they are in prisoner's dilemma. Consider emails, where communication typically consists of call-response type interaction: information is first requested and usually delivered at a later time. Another feature that distinguishes communication networks from prisoner's dilemma experiments is that individuals can hand on information received from others (i.e., information can be relayed between two partners not directly connected).
Research efforts recently intensified to better understand the dynamics of communication networks. The increased attention is partially because of better availability of data (31) (32) (33) . However, analysis and interpretation of such communication data are made difficult, because the context within which the data are produced is usually not fully known. For example, consider the case where information transmitted by email in a given organization is fully known. What may not be known is whether information is exchanged along channels not monitored (e.g., face to face communication during a coffee break). Furthermore, it may be difficult to infer the semantics of messages, which are most often composed of natural language. Difficulty in decoding may again arise, because also, full knowledge of the context is required. To circumvent these obstacles, we take a complementary Significance Social capital can be seen as the economic benefit obtained from preferential treatment between members of a group and has drawn attention because of its ability to increase productivity in modern organizations. However, little is known about how trust dynamically forms between individuals in a competitive environment. We propose the Expert Game played by a group of humans. By constraining available communication capacity, individuals must work under time constraints and gain access to a desired expert by means of communication. Monetary rewards are only given for successful completion of the task. As the game is repeated, our experiments and simulations show how humans develop preference toward others and how social capital is produced. We thereby quantify economic utility of trust.
approach. Our game mimics professional communication with fully recorded messages of known semantics. Core aspects of realistic communication are maintained: individuals are able to act as donors of information or relay information between two others (34) .
Results
We first give essential definitions and explain the structure and rules of the game as well as the experimental setup. We then describe the results and show how emergence of trust and social capital can be understood within a theoretical model.
Definitions and Structure of Experimental Sessions. Two experimental sessions [ID (Dataset S1) and NO-ID (Dataset S2)] were carried out (details are in Materials and Methods). In ID and NO-ID, 16 human participants (i.e., 32 different participants in total) (SI Appendix, Section S5) participated in 25 and 32 games, respectively (SI Appendix, Section S6.2). NO-ID differed from ID in that the names (aliases) assigned to each participant in the electronic interface were changed after each game, whereas they were maintained in ID. We require several definitions. A "round" is the elementary time step of our game. A round allows each player to submit a single message to another. Hence, during one round, 16 messages are typically transmitted-one by each participant. A "game" is a sequence of (on average, six) rounds. To avoid edge effects, the exact number of rounds varied between games and was not known to the participants beforehand (SI Appendix, Section S6.2). At the beginning of each game, the counter of rounds was reset (i.e., all games started at round 1). One game is distinguished from another game by reassigned tasks (described below). The total duration of each experimental session was ∼4 h. During this time, 16 participants were not allowed to communicate by any other means than an electronic interface (SI Appendix, Section S7.2).
The "Expert Game": Game Rules. In the beginning of each game, each participant is assigned a task and expertise. Each participant's task uniquely matches one other participant's expertise. The goal of the game is to receive a reply from the participant with the expertise matching her task. Such a reply is called a confirmation (C). Participants can only communicate by sending standardized messages, of which there are four types ( Fig. 1) : inquiry (I), a request for help, which transmits the sender's task and expertise to the receiver; C confirms that the sender's expertise matches the receiver's task; referral (R), the sender informs the receiver who the expert for the receiver's task is; and negation (N), the sender informs the receiver that she does not know who the expert for the receiver's task is. Note that a participant may only send one message during any round. This message may always be an I to any other participant or alternatively, a reply (C, R, or N) in response to a previously received inquiry (I). Furthermore, the option of sending a given message may always be waived; in that case, no message is sent. Importantly, only confirmations result in a monetary reward, termed "win," which is given only to the receiver of the confirmation. Messages were delivered at the end of each round after every participant had either chosen which message to send or not to send one.
Lies (i.e., factually wrong replies) are not possible, which means that, if a player decides to answer a specific inquiry, only one of the replies (C, R, or N) is possible. If a player, for example, decides to reply to an inquiry and knows which other player is the matching expert, then only a referral is possible, whereas both a negation and a confirmation would be lies. When participants tried to reply using a factually wrong message (e.g., N or C when R was possible), a pop-up message was displayed on their screen, informing the participants of their mistake, and the message was not sent. Participants could then choose another message. Such events were recorded by our software and found to be very rare ( 1%), indicating that participants generally did pay close attention to the logical consistency of their actions and had a clear understanding of the rules.
Experimental Setup. With 16 participants per session and approximately six rounds per game, in ID, a total of ∼6 × 16 × 25 = 2,400 messages were sent, received, and recorded. In NO-ID, where 32 games were reached, somewhat more messages were available (SI Appendix, Section S6.2). As mentioned, in ID, participants were identifiable by aliases, which did not change between games. In NO-ID, new aliases were assigned for each iteration of the game, preventing participants from attributing actions from previous games to other players in the current game. Face to face encounter or other forms of communication were not possible, and all messages were recorded. Similar to common electronic messaging interfaces (e.g., email), participants were shown all messages that they exchanged in previous rounds with other players. Additionally, they were required to take handwritten notes on each message that they received or sent. Participants were allowed but not required to take additional handwritten notes of any kind (details are in SI Appendix, Sections S6 and S7).
To first give an overall comparison of messaging frequency for the different message types in ID vs. NO-ID, we group the data of all games by rounds. The information in Fig. 2 was obtained by pooling all messages sent within a given round of any game by any player (e.g., in the first round of ID, played in all 25 games by all 16 participants, 16 × 25 messages are available). However, because the number of rounds varied between games (SI Appendix, Section S6.2), numbers of messages in later rounds (e.g., round 8) are smaller, leading to higher uncertainties there. We quantify the uncertainty of each data point in each round by the SE (shown in Fig. 2 ).
Increased Cooperation and Efficiency. (ii) Inquiries provide the receiver with the information of the sender's expertise and task. There are three reply types (see schematic): referrals, negations, and confirmations. Only one of these three replies is possible at any given time (i.e., the information that a player has determines the reply type that she can send).
Generally, more replies (N, R, and C) were sent in ID compared with NO-ID ( Fig. 2A) , with ∼30% more replies sent after six rounds. This increase in the frequency of replies is significantly larger than measurement uncertainty. Receiving referrals can accelerate the process of identifying and contacting the required expert compared with contacting all candidates one by one using inquiries. Increased referral frequency, therefore, leads to faster exclusion of possible experts, although the total number of known experts does not increase significantly (Fig. 2B) . Hence, although a similar amount of information is communicated in both sessions, the flow of relevant information in ID is larger than in NO-ID.
Finally, the accelerated search process is reflected in a greater win frequency in ID (Fig. 2C) . The average win frequency is a direct measure of the efficiency with which participants accomplish their tasks. In terms of this measure, ID is more efficient than NO-ID. We expect the effect of referrals on efficiency to increase with a greater number of participants because of the increased number of inquiries necessary to query or exclude candidates one by one (simulations are in SI Appendix, Section S2).
To further explore why referrals and negations are more frequent in ID, we consider potential motivations for sending them ( Fig. 2A) . Replies are only immediately beneficial for the receiver, not the sender. We, therefore, interpret the increased reply frequency in ID ( Fig. 2A) as willingness to cooperate. However, to achieve cooperation, participants must be able to reciprocate. In NO-ID, reciprocation of referrals received from a specific player is largely reduced, because referrals received in previous games cannot be attributed to that specific player in the current game. Lower referral frequency in NO-ID may hence result from fear of exploitation due to reduced accountability, because individuals who do not reciprocate cannot be identified in subsequent games. Note that, even within a single game, some reciprocation may still take place: For example, sending a referral to another participant in an early round may allow the receiver to reciprocate at a later round of the same game. Carrying little useful information for receiver or sender, negations are rarely sent. However, they can be used to inform the receiver that the sender is not unwilling to help but unable to. Thus, we speculate that the somewhat increased frequency of negations in ID might reflect a sender's concern for her attractiveness as a communication partner in subsequent games, an interpretation supported also by survey data (SI Appendix, Section S4 and Table S2 ). In NO-ID, such considerations are again less relevant.
Preference, Reciprocity, and Trust. We now discuss how relations between participants build over time. As mentioned, in ID, participants can identify others across games. Identifiability allows preferential treatment, where a participant may choose to communicate more often with some participants (termed high preference) at the expense of ignoring others (termed low preference).
To quantify preference, we use a statistical model, where each participant is assumed to have a certain preference for each other participant. Furthermore, all participants share a preference for sending messages of each type (I, C, R, and N) independent of the receiver. We assume the probability of sending a particular message to be proportional to the preference for the message type and the sender's preference for the receiver. Using a maximum likelihood hill-climbing algorithm to infer estimates of these preferences (SI Appendix, Section S1), we find the inferred preferences to be in reasonable agreement with survey data (SI Appendix, Fig. S4 ).
We then compute the histograms of preferences (normalized per participant) for both sessions (Fig. 3A) . The comparison shows that the distribution of preferences for ID is substantially wider than that of NO-ID: both low and high preferences are enhanced in ID relative to NO-ID, whereas intermediate preferences are suppressed. The wider distribution indicates preferential treatment of some players at the expense of others in ID. Lack of identifiability across games in NO-ID implies equal preferences of 1=15. As a result, the inferred preferences in NO-ID are narrowly distributed around 1=15 compared with ID.
As in Fig. 2B , we again quantify the information of a given message by considering how many expert candidates the receiver can exclude using the information in this message. For example, if three expert candidates remained before the receipt of a given message and the message is a referral, the two other candidates are immediately eliminated as potential experts, and we assign an information value of two to this message. In contrast to Fig. 2 , where only summary statistics were given, we now associate preferences of communication links with message content and information. We find that, in addition to the higher frequency of messages transmitted along high-preference links, the average information per message is also higher (Fig. 3B) . The higher information content of these messages is explained by an increased frequency of referrals, especially during earlier rounds. Earlier messages are more likely to provide valuable information, because fewer experts have been excluded by the receiver in early rounds.
Reciprocity is a common feature of cooperation (9) . To quantify the reciprocity of the emerging social network of preferences, we compare the network formed by all preferences to shuffled versions. Shuffled networks contain links with the same preference but pointing to randomized targets. This randomization procedure hence suppresses correlation of preference strengths between two nodes (participants). Indeed, highly preferred links in ID are also more often reciprocal (Fig. 3C ). Hence, a participant who maintains strong preference toward another is likely to experience strong preference in return. As a result of the observed reciprocity (Fig. 3C) , we view high preference as an expression of trust between individuals (i.e., the expectation of future cooperative behavior) (9, 24) . Indeed, the basic requirements of "trust" as stated by Deutsch (24) are fulfilled: trust is tied to the expectation of a certain action and entails potentially detrimental sacrifices on the side of trusting individual. The higher rates of referrals along preferred links entail sacrifice (referrals have no immediate benefit to the sender), and participants reasonably expect their preferred partners to reciprocate the preference. We now consider the temporal evolution of the preference network (Fig. 3D) ( i.e., quantify changes from game to game). The network depictions show that strong links are predominantly reciprocal for the different stages of ID. Additionally, strong links are often present in both visualizations of the preference network for the later games. This similarity means that, after trust is established, it persists over extended sequences of games. The gradual polarization (i.e., focus) of preferences during the experimental session can be further quantified using the entropy of the preference distributions (Fig. 3E) . In line with greater polarization of preferences, the mean entropy of the preference distribution of each participant drops notably during the first eight games, reflecting that participants increasingly focus their messages on a few players. The focus thereafter remains consistently stronger for ID compared with NO-ID. In agreement with these findings, our survey results indicate that participants felt that they had friends after 5-10 games (SI Appendix, Section S4).
Theoretical Model. To investigate the dynamics of preferential communication and trust, we conceived a set of agent-based models. In all of our models, the probability Pði → j, tÞ for agent i to send a message of type t ∈ fI, C, R, Ng to agent j depends directly on p t and i's trust in the receiver j denoted as T i→j :
where p t is the priority of message type t, and the trust T i→j depends on past communication between i and j.
Using this general framework, we compare several models that differ in how T i→j is computed. From the range of models (SI Appendix, Section S3), we selected that with the highest likelihood to reproduce our experiment ID. Incidentally, this model was the least complex model. It reproduces the experimentally observed dynamical features well (compare Fig. 3 with SI Appendix, Section S3), especially the emergence of reciprocal preferences, with a similar distribution and the dependence of information flow on preference. In this model, agents build trust by simply counting the number of messages of each type that they receive. More precisely, this model computes T i→j as the sum of a base trust T 0 and the weighted count T p i→j of all messages received from agent j. The weights depend only on the message type of the message received. In this model, the general formulation in 1 becomes
The contribution of T 0 is similar to that of T p i→j when one referral or confirmation has been received (i.e., the relative contribution of T 0 diminishes after only a few games) (SI Appendix, Fig.  S7 ). In short, the model describes how an average player makes choices in ID. The fitted weights p t for this model are similarly high for referrals and confirmations but low for inquiries and negations (SI Appendix, Section S3). The weights qualitatively match survey data: received confirmations and referrals are valued higher than negations or inquiries for building trust (SI Appendix, Fig. S7 ).
Social Capital. A model agent, as described above, mimics the behavior of an average participant. We use these agents, termed normal players, to investigate how participants might react to perturbations-in particular, how normal players would react to an egoistic player, one who never replies. The egoist initially wins more frequently than a normal player, but her capital gain (wins) eventually declines below that of others (Fig. 4A) . The egoist's refusal to reply gives her an initial advantage, but she consequently acquires less trust than others, resulting in reduced preference for her (Fig. 4B) . The lower preference entails a smaller chance of receiving messages (2) in capital gain. In a system with few or no egoists, such a decline of capital gain provides an incentive to cooperate and thus, serves as protection against exploitation. However, if many agents choose the egoistic vs. normal strategy, copying egoistic behavior becomes advantageous, even in the long term. The system may hence become bistable regarding these two strategies (SI Appendix, Section S2).
Recall that social capital can be defined as the economic benefit because of preferential treatment (30) . As described, an agent's capital gain increases with others' preference for her. This preference is determined by how much trust an agent accumulates compared with others (2). The resulting trust network then defines the social capital of each agent. To quantify the social capital of an agent, we compare two realizations: (i) the agent builds trust by helping others (i.e., the agent is a normal player), or (ii) she never helps anyone (no replies; i.e., the agent is an egoist). In both i and ii, a trust network evolves over time.
After an initiation period of t 0 games, the agent has developed different social capital in i and ii. To quantify this difference (ΔSC), we measure the capital gain of the agent for τ = 10 games immediately after the initiation period. During this measurement period, the agent uses the egoist strategy in both realizations. We use identical strategies during the measurement period to ensure that the measured difference in capital gain is solely because of differences in social capital (i.e., the trust network) and not because of an inherent advantage of a strategy. To summarize, we isolate the effect of the trust network on capital gain by using the same strategy during the measurement period for i and ii.
Mathematically, the social capital difference ΔSC between the normal agent and the egoist is ΔSC τ ðt 0 Þ = P t0+τ t=t0 Cðt, T t0,normal Þ − Cðt, T t0,egoist Þ, with Cðt, T Þ being the capital gained by the agent in game t, and T representing the trust network at the beginning of the measurement period in the respective realization (i.e., T t0,normal for case i, and T t0,egoist for case ii). ΔSC, accumulated within t 0 = 20 games of normal behavior compared with egoistic behavior, is highlighted in Fig. 4C (for τ = 10 games). Observe that ΔSC τ increases over time (Fig. 4D) : the longer an agent behaves cooperatively, the greater her social capital (compared with an egoist).
Conclusion
Trust and social capital are invaluable in enabling efficient communication within organizations (26, (35) (36) (37) . Furthermore, increased social capital was linked to increased intellectual capital and innovation (38, 39) . Although social capital received substantial attention, it has proven difficult to define or quantify (30) . An individual's social capital may be affected by many external factors (e.g., similarity in ethnicity, gender, or status), hampering direct measurement or quantification.
Therefore, we took a complementary approach, focusing on how trust and social capital emerge from impersonal electronic communication. The influence of the external effects mentioned was minimized by removing individuals from the societal context in which they are embedded. Furthermore, the way that messages are formulated may influence the likelihood of a response. Controlling for semantics, we use standardized messages and maintain anonymity of participants throughout our experiments using pseudonyms. This setup leaves only repeated electronic messaging as a channel by which social capital could be established.
The experimental results show that preferential treatment emerges from repeated interaction. The network of relationships is characterized by reciprocal preference, increased information flow along preferred links, and a system-wide increase in efficiency. We expect these results to be transferable to real world professional communication networks (e.g., organizations). Central to the emergent features is the gradual development of trust between participants. To see how trust develops, note that sending referrals is only beneficial to an individual if the favor is reciprocated in the future. The observed increased number of referrals in ID implies increased expectations of future benefit (i.e., increased trust). This finding is confirmed directly by the participant survey (SI Appendix, Table S2 ): most stated that they used referrals either in anticipation of reciprocity or to "help or gain friends." This pattern of taking risks motivated by the expectation of benefit is central to the definition of trust in the sense of the work by Deutsch (24) .
In our game, high social capital allows preferential access to knowledge. We mathematically formulate the relation between social capital and trust and show how social capital can be measured as a time-dependent quantity. The dynamics of social capital within a communication network has been quantified. Overall, our highly controlled experiment shows that trust and social capital emerge, even from impersonal electronic communication, if messages can be attributed to members of a communication network. Our study has focused on the beneficial effects of social capital on information flow (39) . Adverse effects (40) (e.g., on individuals attempting to enter an established community) could be explored by a variation of the game.
Materials and Methods
The study involved 32 volunteers (16 per session) drawn from the student body of the University of Copenhagen (SI Appendix, Section S5). In accordance with Danish legislation there was no need for an institutional review board approval (IRB) for this study, as sensitive data -as defined by the Danish Data Protection Agency -was not retrieved from participants. The study was, however, revised and approved by the Center for Experimental Economics at the University of Copenhagen, which reviewed the process to ensure that the consent procedures, instructions, and data collection were conducted in line with good ethical research practice. Our participants volunteered to participate and show up for the study. Participants were introduced to the topic of the experiment on the first page of the instructions and could withdraw at any time if they did not want to participate. Participants, therefore, provided their verbal informed consent to participate in the study. No written consent was obtained as it is not required by the rules of the Center for Experimental Economics at the University of Copenhagen. The participants signed a certificate of participation at completion of the experiment when paid. The certificate formally acknowledges their participation. All participants signed the certificate. Participants interacted through a software interface developed specifically for the experiment (SI Appendix, Section S7). Experiments were supervised by at least one laboratory assistant and at least one of the authors. In each session, all participants were placed in the same computer room, and interaction between participants beyond that allowed by the game rules was prevented. Participants completed a tutorial and test questions to show that they understood the game rules (SI Appendix, Section S8). After completing the experiment, participants filled out a survey. Participants received earnings and show-up fees immediately after completing the survey. The laboratory software used is freely available at https://figshare.com/articles/The_expert_game_Software_ for_experiments/2060415 (41) .
